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INTRODUCTION
China’s long and sordid history of corruption and ineffectual
enforcement in the field of intellectual property has been extensively documented. 1 With respect to the theft of intellectual property rights, Myron A. Brilliant, vice president for Asia at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, declared China public enemy number
one, 2 and the chairman of LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton,
Bernard Arnault, has somberly reflected that China is an especially
big headache. 3 China is the world’s principal platform of production and export in the counterfeit trade. 4 In 2008, eighty-one people across the United States died as a result of a Chinese-made
counterfeit version of the drug heparin. 5 In 2005, 69% of infringing goods seized at the U.S. border were made in China. 6 Their
total value was $87.2 million. 7 China’s share of infringing goods
seized at the border is ten times greater than that of any other U.S.

A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2883. Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete
Journal archive.
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2009; B.A., University of
Southern California, 2006. The author would like to thank Professors Andrew Kent and
Susan Scafidi for their guidance and their comments on drafts of this paper. She would
also like to thank her friends and family for their unending support.
1
See Amy M. Bunker, Deadly Dose: Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals, Intellectual Property and Human Health, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 493 (2007);
Jane K. Winn & Song Yuping, Can China Promote Electronic Commerce Through Law
Reform? Some Preliminary Case Study Evidence, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 415, 446
(2007); Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, From China to Panama, a Trail of Poisoned
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, at 1.
2
Elizabeth Becker, Chamber of Commerce Asks U.S. to Crack Down on Chinese
Copyright Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, at C3 [hereinafter Becker, Chamber of
Commerce].
3
Andrew Yeh, Investing in China: The Complex Trade in Luxury Fakes, FIN. TIMES
OF ASIA, Apr. 19, 2006, at 10.
4
Id.
5
Editorial, The Frightening Heparin Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008, at A22
[hereinafter Heparin Case]; Gardiner Harris, U.S. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2008, at A1 [hereinafter Harris, Tainted Heparin].
6
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO
COMPLIANCE 78 (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/
Reports_Publications/2006/asset_upload_file688_10223.pdf.
[hereinafter
USTR
REPORT].
7
Id.
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trading partner. 8 Chinese crime groups play a key role in this
smuggling enterprise. 9
The economic impact of intellectual property theft on American businesses has been laboriously documented 10 and is estimated
to be approximately $250 billion annually. 11 However, the national security threat posed by this deluge of counterfeits, especially those from China, remains largely overlooked.
This Note employs a broad definition of national security. In
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), national security is
defined as “national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.” 12 While economic interests are not traditionally included in definitions of national security, it is significant in light of the danger counterfeits pose to the U.S. Congress
also has recognized this broad interpretation of national security.
For example, when drafting the statute that created the Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), Congress
chose not to define the term national security. Though CFIUS is
tasked with reviewing the national security implications of Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States, 13 the Committee purposefully left the meaning of national security undefined so that the
term could be interpreted broadly.
This Note exposes the failures of the executive branch to address and monitor national security threats caused by the Chinese
counterfeit industry, as well as the weakness of the statutory tools
in addressing this problem. This Note recommends several statutory changes aimed at monitoring and addressing the national security threats posed by counterfeit goods. The general provisions
which facilitate U.S.-China relations should provide for strict and
8

Id.
Julia Preston, U.S. Charges 51 with Chinatown Smuggling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2004, at B2.
10
See generally U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, http://www.stopfakes.gov (last visited Oct.
20, 2008) (chronicling seminars, news and reports concerning infringement issues).
11
Carlos M. Gutierrez, U.S. Sec’y of Commerce, Remarks at AdvaMed Annual Conference in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.commerce.gov/
NewsRoom/SecretarySpeeches/PROD01_004164.
12
Jennifer Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1830 (2007).
13
See infra notes 224–28 and accompanying text.
9
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detailed monitoring of China’s enforcement of its intellectual
property laws. Potential national security threats caused by counterfeits should be analyzed in the § 6951 reports to Congress, 14 and
in hearings before the United States–China Economic and Security
Review Commission. Finally, Congress should make use of the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to monitor
threats posed by intellectual property theft.
Section I highlights the four areas of national security left vulnerable by a failure to address the trade in counterfeits stemming
from China: consumer safety, economic safety, the financing of
criminal organizations and terror groups and the proliferation of
sensitive technologies. Section II discusses China’s response to
the production of counterfeits within its borders, and its history of
enforcement of intellectual property laws. Finally, Section III offers prescriptions.
I. FOUR AREAS OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY LEFT VULNERABLE
BY CHINA’S TRADE IN COUNTERFEITS
The United States faces a deluge of counterfeit products, the
majority of which come from China. It is estimated that since
2003 about two-thirds of intellectual property–related seizures at
the U.S. border have been goods made in China. 15 Consumer
safety, economic safety, the financing of criminal organizations or
terrorist groups and the transfer of sensitive technology to foreign
groups are four areas in which U.S. national security can be compromised by counterfeits.
A. Consumer Safety
Counterfeit goods pose an enormous risk to consumers, with
the latest incident of counterfeit drugs leading to the death of
eighty-one Americans. 16 While the term national security is not
14
See, e.g., USTR REPORT, supra note 6. The § 6951 report to Congress
is a report established by 22 U.S.C. § 6951 (2006), which mandates
the United States Trade Representative to report annually to Congress on
China’s compliance with its WTO commitments.
15
Yeh, supra note 3.
16
Heparin Case, supra note 5.
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employed in a traditional manner when discussing consumer
safety, it still falls within the broader understanding of national security under economic interests. Perhaps one reason that consumer
safety has been overlooked in determining national security threats
is because the traditional definition of national security is not broad
enough.
The 2007 counterfeit toothpaste scare is a powerful illustration
of how the security of consumers is put in jeopardy because of
Chinese counterfeits. 17 The danger posed by the counterfeit toothpaste was discovered when fifty-one-year-old Eduardo Arias of
Panama City noticed that a tube of toothpaste at the drug store was
prominently marked with “diethylene glycol” (“DEG”). 18 He
alerted the authorities. DEG had caused several deaths in the
country earlier in the year. 19 DEG is a sweet-tasting yet toxic substitute for glycerin.20 And while glycerin is a common ingredient
in medicine, food and household products, 21 DEG, a central nervous system depressant and a kidney and liver toxin, 22 poses a serious risk of injury, especially in children. 23 The tainted toothpaste
was manufactured in China 24 and incorrectly labeled Colgate.25
Some shipments of this toothpaste were detained at the U.S. border
and analyzed by the FDA. 26 But the toothpaste found its way to
prisoners in U.S. jails and wealthy patrons in high-end hotels. 27 It
was used by the mentally disabled, troubled youths and patients in
17

Walt Bogdanich, The Everyman Who Exposed Tainted Toothpaste, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter Bogdanich].
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Urgent Voluntary Nationwide Recall of
Toothpaste (June 8, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/firmrecalls/
goldcity06_07.html [hereinafter FDA Recall].
23
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA ADVISES CONSUMERS TO AVOID TOOTHPASTE
FROM CHINA CONTAINING HARMFUL CHEMICAL (June 1, 2007) [hereinafter FDA
ADVISES].
24
Id.
25
Kristin Graham, Is China’s Growth Counterfeit?, MOTLEY FOOL, Aug. 6, 2007,
http://www.fool.com/investing/international/2007/08/06/is-chinas-growth-counterfeit.
aspx.
26
FDA ADVISES, supra note 23.
27
Bogdanich, supra note 17.
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hospitals. 28 It eventually reached thirty-four countries, including
the United States, Vietnam, Kenya, Nigeria and Canada. 29 The
damage done by counterfeits does not discriminate.
China’s first response was to defend the manufacturers who
used DEG. China stated that the substance was used as a thickening agent in toothpaste and caused no health problems among Chinese consumers. 30 Dora Akunyili, who runs Nigeria’s National
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control, 31 ridiculed
the Chinese response, remarking, “They should apologize to the
world, and not say that it is not dangerous.” 32 Still, even worse
was yet to come: tainted medicines from China were already slipping across U.S. borders, and these medicines, unlike the toothpaste, were fatal.
Leroy Hubley lost his wife and son within a few weeks of each
other; both were poisoned by counterfeit drugs. His loved ones
had a genetic kidney disease that required constant dialysis and a
medicine known as heparin. 33 They unknowingly received Chinese-made heparin that was tainted with a cheap chemical substitute. 34 Hubley was not the only one to suffer such a loss. During
2007 and 2008, eighty-one people across the United States were
killed by tainted Chinese-made heparin. 35 The heparin, a common
blood thinner often given to dialysis patients, was tainted with
chemicals that are known to cause a severe decrease in blood pressure or an allergic reaction. 36 It was manufactured by Changzhou
SPL, a Chinese subsidiary of Scientific Protein Laboratories, 37 and
shipped to eleven countries—Australia, Canada, China, Denmark,
28

Id.
Id.
30
Id.
31
See NFDAC Nigeria, http://www.nafdacnigeria.org/dg.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2008).
32
Bogdanich, supra note 17.
33
Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Says Drug Contamination May Have Been Deliberate, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at A11 [hereinafter Harris, Contamination].
34
Id.
35
See Heparin Case, supra note 5.
36
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BAXTER’S MULTIPLE-DOSE VIAL HEPARIN LINKED TO
SEVERE ALLERGIC REACTIONS (Feb. 11, 2008); see also Heparin Case, supra note 5;
Harris, Contamination, supra note 33; Harris, Tainted Heparin, supra note 5.
37
Harris, Contamination, supra note 33.
29
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France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand and
the United States. 38
The deadly contaminant was identified as oversulfated chondroitin sulfate, a cheap chemical substitute for heparin.39 Heparin
costs $900 a pound, but oversulfated chondroitin sulfate costs a
mere $9 a pound, 40 figures FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von
Eschenbach surely had in mind when he referred to the contaminated drugs as a product of “economic fraud.” 41 The fact that the
cheap chemical substitute was involved pointed to involvement by
Chinese counterfeiters; 42 however, while China admitted that the
tainted heparin originated in its factories, it denied that the medicine had caused any deaths. 43 David G. Strunce, CEO of Scientific
Protein Laboratories, testified before a Senate subcommittee that
he was stopped by Chinese authorities when he tried to find the
original source of the contaminated drugs. 44 And so, only months
after the counterfeit toothpaste scare, another cheap chemical substitute from China arrived to pose a serious health risk to consumers. 45 Though the counterfeit toothpaste did not cause any deaths,
the tainted heparin led to eighty-one fatalities. Could these be the
first instances in an endless wave of potentially deadly counterfeit
products?
Dangerous counterfeits are not a recent development. Manufacturing firms are creating dangerous chemical imitations of
pharmaceuticals made to look like Lipitor. 46 In 2002, New York
authorities broke up a fake Viagra distribution ring originating in
China. 47 The products were a perfect imitation of the real thing,
and even pharmacists could not discern between fake and real

38

Harris, Tainted Heparin, supra note 5.
Id.; see Walt Bogdanich, Heparin Is Now Suspected in 62 Fatalities Across U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A17 [hereinafter Bogdanich, Heparin Suspected].
40
Harris, Contamination, supra note 33.
41
See id.
42
Bogdanich, Heparin Suspected, supra note 39.
43
Harris, Contamination, supra note 33; Harris, Tainted Heparin, supra note 5.
44
Harris, Contamination, supra note 33.
45
See supra notes 16–27 and accompanying text.
46
Graham, supra note 25.
47
Natasha Wong, Counterfeit Medicine: Is It Curing China?, 5 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL’Y J. 155, 180 (2004).
39
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pills. 48 Since 2000, FDA investigations of counterfeit drugs have
increased by over 20%. 49 Consumer danger does not stop at toiletries and prescription drugs. In Los Angeles, buyers can find counterfeit brake pads, aircraft parts, cough syrup and even baby formula. 50
B. Economic Safety
The INA definition of national security and the broad interpretation of national security granted by CFIUS support an interpretation of the term 51 that places high value on protecting the economic interests of the United States. Counterfeits affect the U.S.
economy in two main ways. First, counterfeit currency imported
into the United States, and possibly laundered through Chinese assets, lowers the confidence in the U.S dollar. Second, as counterfeit products harm consumers, the resulting scandals tarnish the
reputation of corporations whose names were falsely placed on the
good.
1. Confidence in the U.S. Money Supply is Weakened
In 2006, FBI agents, acting on a tip, discovered nearly flawless
counterfeit one hundred-dollar bills in false-bottomed compartments of shipping containers entering the U.S. from China. 52
These so-called “supernotes” are believed to be manufactured in
North Korea, though the containers originated in China. 53 Millions
of dollars in fake currency have already been seized. 54 A senior
government official stated that the counterfeit currency could breed
48

Graham, supra note 25.
New Initiatives Take on Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM.,
Aug. 8, 2003, http://www.iccwbo.org/icccbie/index.html.
50
Counterfeit Goods: Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 11 (2005) [hereinafter
Counterfeit Goods Hearing], available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/109s/
21823.pdf. Investigative Consultants is a licensed private investigation firm based in
Southern California that specializes in investigating counterfeit goods. See id. at 1; Investigative Consultants, http://www.investigativeconsultants.com/html/home.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
51
See supra note 12 and infra notes 225–28.
52
Stephen Mihm, No Ordinary Counterfeit, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at 636.
53
Id.
54
See id.
49
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mistrust in the dollar because it is very difficult to tell the notes
apart from the real thing. 55 The same senior official stated that under international law, the traffic in counterfeit currency could be
interpreted as a hostile act against another state. 56
A year before the supernotes were discovered, North Korea
was involved in a counterfeiting incident in Macau, a special administrative region controlled by China. In September 2005, U.S.
law enforcement personnel shut down a major North Korean
money-laundering operation taking place through Macau-based
Banco Delta Asia. 57 When asked if China was also being investigated in the operation, a U.S. Treasury spokesperson refused to
comment. 58 A source reported that following the shutdown, North
Korea moved their assets to a Chinese State-owned bank in the
Zhuhai Special Economic Zone adjacent to Macau. 59
2. Confidence in U.S. Products Is Weakened
Corporations troll the globe for cheap labor to lower costs and
increase profits. 60 For this reason, much manufacturing has been
outsourced to China. 61 However, this outsourcing could cost the
corporation the success of its brand names. 62 For example, during
the counterfeit toothpaste scare, some of the products containing
DEG were found to be sold under the names Colgate and Sensodyne. 63 Counterfeit Colgate toothpaste containing DEG was
found in discount stores in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
and Maryland. 64 Other corporations, such as Gold City Enterprise
55

Id.
Id.
57
John Tkacik, Is China Complicit in North Korean Currency Counterfeiting?,
HERITAGE FOUND., Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/
wm1046.cfm.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Pete Engardio et al., The Future of Outsourcing, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 30,
2006, at 50.
61
See Traci Purdum & John Teresko, Smart Outsourcing, INDUSTRY WEEK,
Oct. 1, 2004, at 71.
62
Graham, supra note 25.
63
Bogdanich, supra note 17.
64
Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Counterfeit Colgate Toothpaste Found
(June 14, 2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/firmrecalls/colgate06_07.html.
56
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and MainStar America, were forced to institute nationwide recalls
of their products. 65 Sensodyne tracked the counterfeit toothpaste
to a factory in the Shejiang Province in China, which was thereafter shut down by regulators. 66
C. Financing of Criminal Organizations and Terror Groups
A critical part of protecting America from terror groups and
criminal organizations is to end their funding. 67 As government
authorities have cracked down on terror-financing schemes involving banks and charities, terror groups have turned to a trade in
counterfeit consumer goods. 68 Insistent vendors on the sidewalks
of metropolises, offering the seemingly innocuous faux Prada
handbags or Hello Kitty T-shirts may be part of a larger terroristfunding operation linked to groups such as Hezbolla or Hamas. 69
Interpol has confirmed that the worldwide counterfeit trade has become a low-cost, high-return enterprise favored by terrorist organizations such as Hezbolla. 70 What makes this trade particularly attractive is that the penalties and risks of getting caught are low,
while the moneymaking potential is enormous. 71 Even when
caught, the criminals are likely to only receive probation, whereas
65
FDA Recall, supra note 22; Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., MainStar
America, LLC Issues Urgent Voluntary Nationwide Recall of Toothpaste (June 13,
2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/po/firmrecalls/mainstar06_07.html. Among
the recalled products were Shir Fresh Mint Fluoride and Dr. Cool Toothpaste. Id.
66
Bogdanich, supra note 17.
67
See, e.g., Juan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Keynote Address at the Ninth Annual American Express Anti-Money Laundering Conference
(June 23, 2004), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1754.htm.
68
Lara Jakes Jordan, Knockoff Profits May Support Terror, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May
26, 2005, at A5; see also Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 2 (statement of
Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs).
69
Jordan, supra note 68; Yeh, supra note 3.
70
Yeh, supra note 3; Chinese Fakes Cost Firms Trillions: Exports of Counterfeit
Japanese Goods to Middle East on the Rise, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 5, 2007, at 2 [hereinafter DAILY YOMIURI]. Testifying before Congress in 2003, the Secretary General of Interpol confirmed that piracy of goods has become a preferred fundraising method for terrorist organizations, and he mentioned groups such as Hezbollah, Chechen rebels and al
Qaeda. Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 2 (statement of Sen. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs).
71
See Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 3 (statement of Sen. Joe Lieberman).
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if they were selling drugs instead, they would go to jail. 72 Chinese
counterfeits specifically are exported through Middle Eastern
countries. 73 To combat Chinese counterfeits of Japanese goods,
Japanese firms have hired investigators. 74 Among their finds were
35,000 counterfeit Nissan sparkplugs in the United Arab Emirates. 75
In hearings before the U.S. Senate, Senator Lieberman recognized the importance of approaching counterfeits from a national
security perspective. 76 He cited an unclassified FBI document
which revealed that Hezbollah used the sale of counterfeit goods to
raise cash in the United States. 77 Senator Susan Collins pointed
out that it does not take a large sum of money to carry out devastating terrorist attacks. 78 The Senator used the example of the 9/11
attacks, which is estimated to have cost only $500,000. 79 The
1993 bombing attack on the World Trade Center only cost an estimated $10,000. 80 Shortly after the bombing the FBI investigated
whether profits made through the sale of counterfeit T-shirts were
used to finance the attack. 81 These relatively modest sums could
easily be raised by such organizations through the sale of counterfeit goods. 82 In Los Angeles, for example, when officers entered a
home to serve an intellectual property right (“IPR”) warrant, they
found a chilling scene. Small Hezbollah flags decorated the suspect’s bedroom, which was also adorned with a portrait of Hassan
Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah. 83 The home contained dozens
of tapes with Nasrallah’s speeches, and a locket with two pictures,
72

Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 13 (statement of Kris Buckner, President, Investigative Consultants).
73
DAILY YOMIURI, supra note 70.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 3 (statement of Sen. Joe
Lieberman).
77
Id.
78
Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 3 (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs).
79
Id.
80
Larry Light, Why Counterfeit Goods May Kill, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 2, 1996, at 6.
81
Id.
82
See id.
83
Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 8 (statement of John C. Stedman,
Lieutenant, County of Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department).
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one of the suspect and one of Nasrallah. 84 During the search, the
suspect’s wife stated that they love Nasrallah because “he protects
us from Jews.” 85
D. Proliferation of Sensitive Technology
The Business Software Alliance (“BSA”) 86 estimates that 92%
of business software in China is pirated. 87 This trade leads to a decrease in value of American brands and can weaken confidence in
U.S. products. 88 More dangerous, though, is the piracy of software
that can be used for military purposes. 89

84

Id.
Id. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department shares a very close relationship with the
Los Angeles Joint Terrorism Task Force because IPR warrants so often lead to evidence
of possible terrorism. This information relating to terrorist financing is passed on from
the Sheriff’s Department to the Task Force. Id.
86
The BSA is respected as the foremost organization dedicated to promoting a safe
and legal digital world. It often serves as the voice for its many members, which include
Adobe, Apple, Autodesk, Avid, Bentley Systems, Borland, CNC Software/Mastercam,
McAfee, Microsoft, PTC, SolidWorks, Sybase, Symantec, The MathWorks and UGS.
The goals of the BSA are to promote technology innovation through education and policy
initiatives, as well as to promote copyright protection, cyber security, trade and ecommerce. See BSA, About BSA & Members, http://www.bsa.org/country/
BSA%20and%20Members.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). The BSA has been known
to bring suits on behalf of its members against companies found to have unlicensed software on their computer. See Press Release, BSA, BSA Conducts Record Global AntiPiracy Enforcement Action (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.
bsa.org/country/News%20and%20Events/News%20Archives/en/2007/en-09182007globalsettlement.aspx. The BSA estimates that 35% of software installed on personal
computers worldwide is pirated, equaling approximately $40 billion in global losses to
companies. BSA, 2007 Global Piracy Study, http://w3.bsa.org/globalstudy (last visited
Oct. 20, 2008). In 2006, 55% of software installed on personal computers in the Asia
Pacific region was pirated. See id.
87
See Press Release, BSA, Major Study Finds 53 Percent of Software in Use in Asia
Pacific Region Is Pirated (July 7, 2003) (on file with author), available at
http://w3.bsa.org/asia-eng/press/newsreleases/Major-Study-Finds-53-Percent-ofSoftware-in-Use-in-Asia-Pacific-Region-is-Pirated.cfm.
88
See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 18 (2007), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/12/38707619.pdf.
89
See John Schwartz, Black Market for Software Is Sidestepping Export Controls,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at C1.
85

VOL19_BOOK1_NASTASE

156

12/2/2008 6:20:52 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 19:143

Intelligent Light is an engineering company that creates software so powerful that it is bound by export controls. 90 Before the
Internet became the company’s primary software distribution
mechanism, its president would receive letters, handwritten and
bearing stamps from Iraq, which read, “We have heard of your
beautiful software. . . . We would like to buy it.” 91 Since the advent of the Internet, these letters have stopped arriving. Despite
export controls, bootlegged copies of Intelligent Light’s software
have been found to be sold over the Internet by Chinese “entrepreneurs” for two hundred dollars apiece. 92 A popular business
method for software pirates is to use Internet auction sites to sell
their illicit goods. 93
The Internet has facilitated the emergence of a black market for
powerful scientific and engineering software. 94 Encryption technology, for example, in hardware or software form, helps scramble
computer data such as e-mail or database information, to keep it
private. 95 The proliferation of encryption technology was deemed
such a serious risk to national security that the Clinton administration tried to limit its exportation. 96 Exportation of this technology
remains heavily controlled through the Arms Export Control Act
of 1976 97 and the International Trade in Arms Regulations
(“ITAR”). 98 Indeed, cryptographic software is specifically listed
on the ITAR munitions list. 99 Export licensing and export controls

90

See id. Intelligent Light is based out of Lyndhurst, N.J. and creates software for
computational fluid dynamics. See id.; FieldView: About Intelligent Light,
http://www.ilight.com/about.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
91
See Schwartz, supra note 89. The President of Intelligent Light is Jeanne L.
Mara. Id.
92
Id.
93
BSA, Internet Software Piracy Fact Sheet, http://w3.bsa.org/ireland/antipiracy/
upload/Internet-Piracy-Factsheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
94
See Schwartz, supra note 89.
95
BSA, Electronic Signatures, http://www.bsa.org/country/Public%20Policy/Security/
Related%20Issues/Electronic%20Signatures.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2008).
96
See Schwartz, supra note 89.
97
22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2006).
98
Stuart Schwartzstein, Export Controls on Encryption Technology, 16 SAIS REV. 13,
15 (1996), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v016/16.1schwartzstein.
html.
99
Id.
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were a major tool for preventing proliferation; however, with the
prevalence of Internet piracy, these controls have become moot. 100
Despite encryption technology’s strict regulations, there are
even more serious technologies being proliferated. 101 Software
powerful enough to design missiles and nuclear reactors, or predict
the path of a cloud of anthrax spores, is being readily proliferated. 102 A Justice Department official confirmed that software
used to model the fuel flow in a fighter jet is being sold on the
World Wide Web. 103 With a simple wire transfer, such software
can slip past national barriers with great ease. 104
II. CHINA’S ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
HAS BEEN WEAK
A. China Has Clashed with the U.S. in the Past over the Weak
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights
China has failed to aggressively enforce intellectual property
rights and combat the counterfeit and piracy epidemic in its nation. 105 The United States and China have clashed over the issue
of counterfeit materials for over a decade. 106 For example, in 1995
the Chinese Government refused to shut down twenty-nine factories which illegally produced approximately seventy million copies
of American films and software every year. 107 Fed up with the
rampant piracy, the Clinton administration threatened to block
China’s effort to join the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). 108
100

See Schwartz, supra note 89.
See id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
See id.
105
See id.
106
See, e.g., Seth Faison, U.S.-China Talks over Piracy Fail, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1996, at A1; David Lague, U.S. Presses Chinese on Piracy, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov.
14, 2006, at 15.
107
David Sanger, U.S. Threatens $2.8 Billion of Tariffs on China Exports, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1995, at 14.
108
See id.
101
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Today, major intellectual property enforcement issues in China
have yet to be resolved, and in 2007 the United States filed a formal WTO piracy complaint against China. The United States
sought to establish a dispute settlement panel focused on the enforcement of copyrights and trademarks and cited serious deficiencies in China’s legal regime. 109 In part, the complaint is directed at
China’s high quantitative threshold of infringement that must be
met before prosecution proceedings can be launched. Distributors
of counterfeit goods who operate below the thresholds can do so
without fear of criminal liability. 110 These thresholds effectively
function as safe harbor provisions. 111 Further, if Chinese authorities discover counterfeit goods, they will release the goods back
into the stream of commerce once the fake label is removed. 112
This contravenes WTO rules, which state that the goods should be
kept out of the marketplace. 113 Lastly, the complaint discusses the
Chinese practice of not offering copyright protection for works that
have yet to receive censorship approval. 114 While legal distributors cannot sell the works, pirates have no such qualms. 115 It is
critical that copyright protection for new works be immediately
granted.
It is important to note that the issue of national security is not
brought up in the complaint. 116 While the WTO is an organization
specifically directed at trade between nations, this omission is a reflection of the overall U.S. deficiency in addressing the national
security dangers posed by counterfeit goods.

109

Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States Requests WTO Panel in
Case Challenging Deficiencies in China’s Intellectual Property Rights Laws (Aug. 13,
2007) (on file with author), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_
Library/Press_Releases/2007/August/United_States_Requests_WTO_Panel_in_Case_
Challenging_Deficiencies_in_Chinas_Intellectual_Property_Rights_Laws.html.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
See id.
116
See id.
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B. Chinese Legal Efforts in Combating Intellectual Property Theft
In the last few years, China has made several efforts to pass
laws and enter into agreements that protect intellectual property.
For example, the Clinton Administration reached multiple agreements with China aimed at ending the counterfeiting of tapes,
movies and compact disks. 117
In anticipation of joining the WTO, China first joined the
World Intellectual Property Organization, and acceded to its IP
treaties, 118 including the Paris Convention, dealing with patents
and trademarks; 119 the Madrid Agreement, concerning the registration of trademarks; 120 the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, protecting layout-design; 121 and the
Berne Convention, pertaining to copyrights. 122 High contracting
parties to the treaties are bound to enforce them through the implementation of domestic laws throughout their territory. China
became a member of the WTO on December 11, 2001, after fifteen
years of negotiations. 123
The agreements do not end there. On April 21, 2004, the
Bush administration, during a day-long trade meeting, received
several concessions from the Chinese government. 124 Among
them was China’s agreement to increase the range of activities that
are subject to criminal penalties for intellectual property violations.
These new penalties would apply to the import, export, storage as
well as the distribution of pirated and counterfeit products. 125
More recently, after the counterfeit toothpaste crisis, the Chinese
117

Elizabeth Becker, China Agrees to Postpone Wireless Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2004, at C1 [hereinafter Becker, China Agrees].
118
Kate Colpitts Hunter, Here There Be Pirates: How China is Meeting its IP Enforcement Obligations Under TRIPS, 8 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 523, 532 (2007).
119
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property arts. 1, 6bis, Mar. 20,
1883, revised, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, T.I.A.S. No. 6903, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
120
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks art. 1, Apr.
14, 1891, revised, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 389.
121
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Integrated Circuits art. 2, May 26, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1477.
122
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty pmbl., Dec. 20,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 65, 1997 WL 79494.
123
Hunter, supra note 118, at 533.
124
Becker, China Agrees, supra note 117.
125
Id.
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government promised to reform their regulatory system for food,
medicine and consumer products. 126
C. Obstacles to Intellectual Property Enforcement in China
China has a long history of corruption and ineffectual enforcement in the field of intellectual property, and a widespread culture
of industrial counterfeiting and fraud. 127 China’s citizens suffer
most from China’s counterfeit industry. 128 Leaders of China’s
State Food and Drug Administration have admitted that their
pharmaceutical market is awash in fake and deadly drugs. 129
China’s markets are flooded with fake antibiotics, vaccines, drugs
for erectile dysfunction 130 and blood products. 131 Even medicine
aimed at strengthening the immune system has been counterfeited
and sold as authentic. 132 The total cost in human lives of this broken system cannot be estimated, even by the Chinese government; 133 however, in 2001, the Shenzhen Evening News, a government-controlled newspaper, estimated that 192,000 people died
in China that year because of fake pharmaceutical products. 134
There are endless illustrations of the pervasive counterfeit
problem in China. Among them are plastic bottles refilled with tap
water and sold as mineral water, 135 and the numerous derivative
Harry Potter books with titles like “Harry Potter and the Big Funnel,” and “Rich Dad, Poor Dad and Harry Potter.” 136 In fact, in
126

Bogdanich, supra note 17.
Peter Allgeier, U.S. Ambassador to the WTO, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.,
Statement on Trade Policy Review of China given in Geneva, Switz.
(Apr. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/
2006/April/Trade_Policy_Review_of_China,_Statement_by_Ambassador_Peter_Allgeier
_printer.html.
128
See David Barboza, A Chinese Reformer Betrays His Cause, and Pays, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2007, at A1.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Howard French, China’s Economic Revival Is Minted in Counterfeit, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Aug. 4, 2007, at 2.
132
Barboza, supra note 128.
133
Id.
134
Peter Goodman, China’s Killer Headache: Fake Pharmaceuticals, WASH. POST,
Aug. 30, 2002, at A1.
135
French, supra note 131.
136
Id.
127
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China there are more copies of fake Harry Potter books than real
ones. 137
China faces considerable hurdles in enforcing the many intellectual property laws and agreements it has enacted. Chief among
them are corrupt officials. The accusations of widespread local
corruption in China are not new. In 1995, while twenty-nine factories in southern China were busy churning out illegal copies of
American videotapes and software, Chinese central government officials were bemoaning their lack of influence in the region. 138
The officials stated that they had too little control over the region
to put an end to this piracy. 139 Rejecting the Chinese argument as
preposterous, the U.S. stated that China faces a “failure of will . . .
not a failure of ability,” when it comes to enforcement of copyright
laws. 140 As evidence for this statement, the U.S. pointed out that
many of the counterfeiting enterprises were in fact run by central
government officials and were closely tied to local and national political leaders. 141 If so, corrupt Chinese officials would have no incentive to enforce the copyright laws that would tighten their
spigot of profits from pirated goods. In 2006, Ambassador Peter
Allgeier stated clearly that local corruption is one of the main factors that contribute to widespread intellectual property theft. 142
And when the FBI conducted a study of Chinese criminal enterprises, it cited corruption at a local level as an important factor in
smuggling of counterfeit and pirated goods. 143
However, in hearings before Congress, a commissioner of the
U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission pointed
out that despite rampant copyright infringement, China’s Olympic

137

Id.
Sanger, supra note 107, at 14. Piracy was so widespread even as far back as 1995
that pirated copies of the videotape of Disney’s The Lion King were being distributed in
China before the tape was even released in the United States. Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Allgeier, supra note 127.
143
See Ning-Ning Mahlmann, Chinese Criminal Enterprises, in ASIAN CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISE PROGRAM OVERVIEW: A STUDY OF CURRENT FBI ASIAN CRIMINAL
ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1999).
138
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mascot had yet to be counterfeited. 144 He implied that China can
in fact enforce its intellectual property laws, if it so chooses. 145
Today, the production of counterfeits is primarily concentrated in
China’s southern provinces. 146 Guangdong, for example, has become the world’s primary source of luxury fakes, such as clothing,
handbags and watches. 147
Institutionalized corruption led to the greatest food and drug
scandal in China and the execution of one of its top officials.
Zheng Xiaoyu was once China’s most powerful regulator and the
creator of its Food and Drug Administration. 148 Intent on improving standards in China’s pharmaceutical industry, the newly created agency cracked down on fake drugs and illegal factories. 149
However, while the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approves
about 140 new drugs each year, Mr. Zheng’s agency approved over
150,000 during his eight-year tenure. 150 This high approval rate
was a consequence of Mr. Zheng receiving more than $850,000 in
gifts and bribes from pharmaceutical companies seeking special
favors. 151 The Supreme People’s Court found Mr. Zheng guilty of
accepting bribes, and on July 5, 2007, Mr. Zheng was executed. 152
Other efforts to combat corruption have been less brutal. China
has sought to improve judges’ salaries and create clear rules regarding gift-giving. 153 Still, there is a large market for counterfeits
in China, particularly because the Chinese government limits the

144

See China’s Proliferation and the Impact on Trade Policy on Defense
Industries in the United States and China: Hearing Before the U.S.-China
Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 110th Cong. 19 (2007) [hereinafter Proliferation]
(statement of Michael R. Wessel, Comm’r, U.S.-China Econ. & Sec.
Review Comm’n), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/
july_12_13/july_12_13_07_trans.pdf.
145
See id.
146
Yeh, supra note 3.
147
Id.
148
Barboza, supra note 128.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. Indeed, when fake drugs and illegal factories are discovered, corrupt local officials often try to protect companies in their area from punishment. See id.
152
Id.
153
Hunter, supra note 118, at 544.
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importation of legitimate recordings and movies; this leaves a huge
gap in demand, which is primarily filled with counterfeit goods. 154
Some scholars have hypothesized that another problem with
enforcement lies in the Chinese intellectual property legal system
itself, which places emphasis on compromise and harmony, inclining it toward mediation and arbitration. 155 Such a system is illsuited for the strong litigation that is necessary to enforce and defend intellectual property rights in a market economy. 156
Among other legal problems with enforcement is China’s very
high threshold for criminal prosecution of intellectual property violations. 157 The infringement has to be on a very large scale in order for the government authorities to bring criminal charges. 158
This effectively creates “safe harbor” provisions for criminals. 159
In addition, communism decimated the legal profession in
China. 160 The legal system now faces long delays due to a shortage of qualified legal personnel able to take on intellectual property cases. 161
D. China’s Response when Attacked on Intellectual Property
Issues
When faced with accusations regarding its counterfeit industry,
China does not usually respond constructively. Instead of addressing the main problem, China historically goes on the attack. For
example, in reaction to the United States’ 1995 threat of $2.8 billion in sanctions for China’s refusal to close down twenty-nine piracy factories, China immediately threatened to take counterretaliatory measures. 162 In its response, China threatened, among
154

Becker, Chamber of Commerce, supra note 2 (“By limiting the import of legitimate
recordings, the Chinese government leaves a demand ‘that is currently primarily met by
Chinese pirates.’” (quoting Neil Turkewitz, executive vice president of the Recording
Industry Association of America)).
155
Hunter, supra note 118, at 528–29.
156
Id. at 530.
157
USTR REPORT, supra note 6, at 74.
158
Id. at 78.
159
Id.
160
Hunter, supra note 118, at 542.
161
Id.
162
Sanger, supra note 107.
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other things, that it would hold up applications of American companies to set up businesses in China and would suspend talks with
American automobile manufacturers over joint ventures. 163 There
was no suggestion of constructive dialogue or talks.
Indeed, when faced with crises over goods produced in
China, the Chinese government typically takes an offensive stance.
China’s response to manufacturing criticism during the summer of
2007, when Mattel recalled twenty million toys manufactured in
China, 164 is particularly illustrative. Part of the recall was due to
excessive lead in the toys. 165 In an August 14th conference call,
Mattel laid the blame for the recall on a Chinese subcontractor who
had violated Mattel’s policies by using paint from non-authorized
third party suppliers. Robert Eckert, the chairman and CEO of
Mattel, elaborated on these accusations in his testimony before the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, 166 in which he stated that the
vendors were not just careless, but also in some cases were deliberate in avoiding the requirements. 167 On September 21, 2007,
Thomas A. Debrowski, Mattel’s executive vice president for
worldwide operation, met with Li Changjiang, the head of China’s
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and
Quarantine. 168 Mr. Li pointed out that a large part of Mattel’s
profits comes from factories in China, and that China’s cooperation
should be valued. 169 Indeed, 65% of Mattel’s toys are manufactured in China. 170 Mr. Debrowski apologized to China for any
harm caused to the reputation of Chinese manufacturers by the recalls. 171 Dara O’Rourke, an associate professor at the University
of California, Berkeley, speculated that Mattel is committed to operating its factories in China and does not want to jeopardize its
manufacturing operation. 172 Mr. Debrowski’s apology was made
163

Id.
Graham, supra note 25; Louise Story, An Apology in China from Mattel, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at C1.
165
Graham, supra note 25; Story, supra note 164.
166
Graham, supra note 25.
167
Id. at 3.
168
Story, supra note 164.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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to appease Chinese manufacturers. It came despite the fact that
millions of toys were in fact contaminated by lead. 173 Given what
is publicly known, it appears that Mattel gave in to pressure from
the Chinese government.
What these responses make clear is that the United States cannot rely on China to self-regulate or take actions weighty enough
to deal with the problem of counterfeits. There should be better
U.S. mechanisms in place to manage this problem.
III. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAKE BETTER USE OF ITS
AVAILABLE STATUTORY TOOLS IN ADDRESSING THE NATIONAL
SECURITY THREAT POSED BY CHINA’S WEAK INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
Congress and the executive branch should implement key
statutory changes to monitor and address the national security
threats posed by counterfeit goods. First, the general provisions
which facilitate U.S.-China relations should provide for strict
monitoring of China’s enforcement of its intellectual property
laws. U.S. officials should also address the national security
threats that develop because of counterfeits in the § 6951 reports
and in U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission reports and hearings. Finally, CFIUS was created to identify potential national security threats. Congress should make use of the
Commission in monitoring the threats posed by intellectual property theft.
A. Congress Should Strengthen and Clarify the General
Provisions of Title 22 Chapter 77—United States-China
Relations
The United States Code Title 22 Chapter 77 174 lays out the
statutory provisions for monitoring and enforcing U.S.-China relations, as well as the commissions responsible for oversight. It is
the principal statutory vehicle for regulating foreign relations be173

See id. (reporting that approximately 2.6 million toys were recalled due to lead paint
being used).
174
22 U.S.C §§ 6901–03, 6911–13, 6931, 6941–43, 6951, 6961–65, 6981–84, 6991,
7001–02 (2006).
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tween the two states. Congress should strengthen these provisions
to specifically address intellectual property and its connection to
national security.
Congressional findings in this section address the trade in
goods between the two nations and the increasing trade deficit. 175
However, despite the ever-growing market in pirated and counterfeit goods from China, Congress does not address this fact. The
problem of intellectual property theft is so serious and pervasive
that it should be among the general congressional findings on U.S.China relations in § 6901. Its inclusion would serve as a signal to
the Executive, who implements the statutory provisions, that it is
an area that Congress deems serious enough to be addressed. Just
as Congress deplores China’s violations of human rights, religious
freedom and worker rights, 176 it should deplore the intellectual
property violations which gravely affect U.S. national security.
In § 6902 the United States does seek to “pursue effective enforcement of trade-related and other international commitments by
foreign governments.” 177 The IP agreements signed by China
could fall into the trade-related category. However, the wording is
overbroad, and intellectual property is not mentioned at all, much
less the relationship between U.S. national security and IP. Indeed,
the primary objective of this section is to monitor human rights. 178
Congress calls for “an annual review . . . of the compliance by
the People's Republic of China with its terms of accession to the
WTO.” 179 China has enacted the intellectual property treaties
called for under the WTO agreement, 180 but enforcement has been
problematic, as was previously discussed. It is very important that
Congress clarify the meaning of the word “compliance.” 181 The
word is not defined in § 6903, where the definitions for Chapter
77—U.S.-China Relations can be found. Does “compliance” refer
to China’s enactment of the appropriate laws, to their enforcement
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

22 U.S.C. § 6901(4)–(5).
Id. § 6901(12).
Id. § 6902(2).
Id. § 6902(5).
Id. § 6931.
See supra notes 119–22 and accompanying text.
22 U.S.C. § 6931.
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or to both? A clarification is especially needed for this section because it deals specifically with the monitoring and enforcement of
China’s WTO commitments. It should be made clear to China that
at all times it will be monitored not just on the proper enactment of
these laws, but also on their enforcement. China, besides acceding
to the intellectual property treaties, also joined several other relevant trade treaties as part of its WTO commitments. Considering
the importance of intellectual property and the dangers that counterfeit goods can pose to U.S. national security, this section should
also specifically mention the monitoring of intellectual property
commitments, so that “WTO commitments” is not mistaken to
mean exclusively, or principally, trade commitments. The vague
language of the section leaves little chance that national security
will be addressed when these provisions are implemented.
The meaning of “compliance” is expanded in §§ 6941 to 6943.
Section 6941 deals with the congressional findings regarding compliance with trade agreements. 182 The section reads, in relevant
part, “The United States Government must continue to be vigilant
in monitoring and enforcing the compliance by our trading partners
with trade agreements in order for United States businesses, work182

Id. § 6941. The Congress finds as follows:
(1) The opening of world markets through the elimination of tariff
and nontariff barriers has contributed to a 56-percent increase in exports of United States goods and services since 1992.
(2) Such export expansion, along with an increase in trade generally,
has helped fuel the longest economic expansion in United States history.
(3) The United States Government must continue to be vigilant in
monitoring and enforcing compliance by our trading partners with
trade agreements in order for United States businesses, workers, and
farmers to continue to benefit from the opportunities created by market-opening trade agreements.
(4) The People’s Republic of China, as part of its accession to the
World Trade Organization, has committed to eliminating significant
trade barriers in the agricultural, services, and manufacturing sectors
that, if realized, would provide considerable opportunities for United
States farmers, businesses, and workers.
(5) For these opportunities to be fully realized, the United States
Government must effectively monitor and enforce its rights under the
agreements on the accession of the People’s Republic of China to the
WTO.

Id.
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ers, and farmers to continue to benefit from the opportunities created by market-opening trade agreements.” 183 Whether “compliance” here should be read as enactment of laws, enforcement of
laws or both is again unclear. A clue about the intention of these
sections can be found in the immediately following paragraph,
which states that China “has committed to eliminating significant
trade barriers . . . that, if realized, would provide considerable opportunities for United States farmers, businesses, and workers.” 184
Read together, these two sections seem to be geared primarily toward trade barriers, and “compliance” would most likely mean
China’s elimination of trade barriers through enactment of laws.
There is no mention of enforcing intellectual property laws. Businesses and workers would benefit tremendously from clear congressional statutory statements on combating the theft of intellectual property.
While the language in § 6941(3) and § 6941(5) could be used
as a tool in demanding China’s enforcement of its intellectual
property laws, it would be a stretch to state that Congress enacted
these sections in response to counterfeits from China affecting U.S.
interests and national security. And therein lies the problem. A
crisis as serious as that caused by Chinese counterfeits pouring into
the United States needs clear words and clearer actions. These are
lacking in the United States Code.
Statutorily, there is a prohibition on the importation of products
from China created by forced or prison labor. 185 There is no comparable prohibition on the importation of products created with
child or slave labor, which is in fact how many counterfeit goods
are produced. 186
Section 6943 laboriously sets aside money every fiscal year for
monitoring China’s compliance with its WTO commitments and
183

Id. § 6941(3).
Id. § 6941(4).
185
Id. §§ 6941–65.
186
See South East Asia Investigations into Social and Humanitarian Activities
(SISHA), SISHA NEWSL., Aug. 2007, available at http://www.sisha.org/
newsletter/newsletter_august.pdf (“The counterfeit goods trade relies upon exploitation
of mostly poor and mostly young labor in developing countries to produce the copied
merchandise.”).
184
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international trade obligations. 187 Indeed, under § 6951, an annual
report on compliance has to be submitted to Congress. However,
there is no explicit provision that intellectual property needs to be a
major part of this report, much less that the report needs to address
the national security implications of intellectual property theft.
B. There is a Failure on the Part of the Executive to Monitor the
Potential National Security Threats Caused by China’s
Intellectual Property Violations Through the 22 U.S.C. § 6951
Report to Congress
The Executive is mandated to provide, on a yearly basis, a
report to Congress addressing China’s compliance with its WTO
obligations. 188 In the past this report has thoroughly addressed the
Chinese service industry and the import and export regulations, but
has put little focus on intellectual property enforcement and no focus whatsoever on the national security implications of intellectual
property theft. In the 2006 Report to Congress on China’s WTO
Compliance, national security is not mentioned even once. 189
In 2006, the report clearly stated that its focus is on trade concerns and that it “does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the
many areas in which China’s WTO compliance efforts have or
have not . . . satisfied particular commitments.” 190 One such area
that lacks exhaustive analysis is intellectual property, to which a
mere 8 out of 109 pages is dedicated. The report has opportunities
to address the intellectual property issue at greater length, but
misses them. According to a new Chinese development policy,
foreign investors in the steel industry have to possess proprietary
technology or intellectual property, but foreign investors are not
allowed to have a controlling share in the industry. 191 Therefore
the technology requirement becomes a de facto intellectual property transfer. 192 The report’s conclusion on this issue is that the

187
188
189
190
191
192

22 U.S.C. § 6943(b)(1).
Id. § 6951.
See USTR REPORT, supra note 6.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 56.
Id.
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policy contravenes WTO protectionism standards. 193 The report
fails to analyze the U.S. national security implications of these
technology transfers. The destination of the intellectual property
of a heavily regulated and strategic industry should be of great
concern to the U.S.; the report misses a key opportunity to discuss
it.
The report states that China has little success in enforcing its
intellectual property laws; 194 however, specific problems with enforcement do not receive an in-depth discussion. Most of the discussion centers on the actions that the U.S. has taken to urge China
to strengthen enforcement, including round table meetings, and
IPR working groups, 195 and IPR laws enacted by China. 196 The
only specific enforcement problem addressed is the faulty Chinese
criminal prosecution system, which has such a high bar for infringement that it creates de facto “safe harbor” provisions for
criminals. 197 In only one line of the report is corruption mentioned
as a factor in the counterfeit goods trade. 198 The report does not
expand on corruption at all and offers no discussion or data on how
widespread the problem really is.
Further, the report discusses only the most innocuous infringing goods. The report mentions the piracy of operating system
software, 199 music and movies. 200 The piracy of controlled technology is not mentioned at all, and of course, a look into the national implications of this piracy is also missing. The serious
health risk posed by counterfeit pharmaceuticals is touched on in
only one line, without further elaboration. 201 Despite claiming to
have figures on counterfeit goods made in China and seized at U.S.
borders, the report does not mention what portion of these goods
are fake drugs. 202 Overall, the report fails to address specific
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 75.
See id. at 78.
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threats posed by counterfeit Chinese goods and specific obstacles
in the enforcement of these laws in China.
C. Congress Should Strengthen the Provisions of 22 U.S.C. §
7002—U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
to Address Intellectual Property
In 2000 Congress created the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (“USCC”). 203 The USCC is tasked with
monitoring, investigating and reporting to Congress on “the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of
China.” 204 National security problems caused by counterfeit goods
from China would certainly fall under this mandate. And so, this
commission would be an ideal vehicle to conduct a thorough
analysis of the effect that counterfeit goods have on national security.
The USCC is also mandated to submit an annual report to
Congress. 205 The minimum contents of this report reveal the focus
of this commission. At a minimum the report has to contain: a discussion of China’s trade, transfer and acquisition of military systems, or systems which could be used for military purposes; 206
China’s intentions in pursuing military competition or actions; 207
the effects of China’s currency manipulations; 208 actions taken by
China in the context of the WTO; 209 China’s patterns of investment; 210 and whether or not the trade surplus enhances China’s
military budget. 211 Intellectual property considerations are not
mentioned at all in the mandate.

203

22 U.S.C. § 7002 (2006). The USCC was created on October 30, 2000, through the
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 2001, sec. 1238, available at
http://www.uscc.gov/about/overview.php.
204
22 U.S.C. § 7002(b)(2).
205
Id. § 7002(c)(1).
206
Id. § 7002(c)(2)(A)–(C).
207
Id. § 7002(c)(2)(E)–(F).
208
Id. § 7002(c)(2)(F).
209
Id. § 7002(c)(2)(G).
210
Id. § 7002(c)(2)(H).
211
Id. § 7002(c)(2)(I).
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It is no small wonder that in the USCC’s 2007 Report to Congress, intellectual property is only mentioned seven times. 212 This
is so despite the fact that the USCC listed counterfeiting and piracy
as one of the eight factors that serve as major drivers of China’s
economy 213 and as a major contributor to the growing U.S. trade
deficit with China. 214 The effects of intellectual property violations on the field of national security are not discussed at all in the
final report. When the Commission does briefly discuss intellectual property, it is only to mention that Chinese businesses have
been actively seeking Hong Kong as their legal jurisdiction because it provides better legal protection and enforcement of IP
rights than mainland China. 215 This silence is ironic because the
USCC’s report to Congress already must address national security
issues relating to China because it must report on China’s military
advances. 216 A brief yearly analysis of the effects of counterfeits
from China would not only fall under the letter of the law, 217 but
also under its spirit of ensuring the security of the United States.
The USCC seems trapped by a narrow and traditional definition of
national security, which focuses primarily on military threats. The
national security threats posed by intellectual property violations
are not as obvious, but they should be included in the future considerations of national security.
Finally, the recommendations of the report are perhaps the
greatest disappointment of the document. The recommendations
do not mention intellectual property at all.218 Considering the
depth of knowledge and experience of the panel, the USCC should
have offered something more useful than just recommending that
the U.S. urge Chinese officials to be as forthcoming as possible to
“prevent . . . anxieties [from] swell[ing] into adversarial inclination[s].” 219
212

See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS, June 1,
2007 [hereinafter USCC REPORT], available at http://www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2007/
annual_report_full_07.pdf.
213
Id. at 2.
214
Id.
215
USCC REPORT, supra note 212, at 19.
216
See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.
217
See supra note 209.
218
USCC REPORT, supra note 212, at 5–6.
219
Id. at 5.
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Oddly enough, the USCC seems to be perfectly aware of the
national security implications of piracy and counterfeits. In July of
2007, the USCC held hearings on China’s proliferation of sensitive
technology. 220 Representative Duncan Hunter discussed a 2006
Institute for Defense Analysis report which found that Chinese
companies advertise their reverse engineering capabilities aimed at
recovering “sensitive date and intellectual property.” 221 The report
goes on to mention that several Pentagon projects have been affected by counterfeit microelectronics from China. A panel later
discussed the importance of assessing the Department of Defense
programs and microchips that could be put at risk by intellectual
property theft. 222
While the USCC did not directly address China’s lackadaisical
enforcement of copyrights in its hearings, Commissioner Michael
Wessel did point out that despite the rampant copyright infringement taking place in China, the Olympic mascot has yet to be
counterfeited, 223 thereby coyly implying that China can in fact enforce copyrights if it so chooses. But hints and implications are
not appropriate to congressional reviews. Clear statements are
needed. These scattered references cannot form a compelling basis
for addressing the threat that intellectual property violations by
China pose to U.S. national security.
D. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Should be Used to Analyze the Potential National Security
Threats Caused by Intellectual Property Violations
1. What is CFIUS?
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(“CFIUS”) is an interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of
Treasury and tasked with reviewing Foreign Direct Investment
(“FDI”) 224 in the United States. The Committee must “determine
220

Proliferation, supra note 144.
Id. at 103–04.
222
Id. at 120–22.
223
Id. at 19.
224
Ilene Knable Gotts, Leon Greenfield & Perry Lange, Is Your Cross-Border Deal the
Next National Security Lightning Rod?, 16 BUS. L. TODAY 31 (2007).
221
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the effects of [an FDI] transaction on the national security of the
United States.” 225 FDI covers “any merger, acquisition, or takeover that is proposed or pending . . . by or with any foreign power
which could result in foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.” 226 If CFIUS finds that the
transaction “could result in the control of any person engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States by a foreign government
or an entity controlled or acting on behalf of a foreign government, 227 the Committee conducts an investigation. 228
Parties generally file a voluntary written notice in which they
must particularly identify any sensitive technologies or information
that the entity possesses. 229 This is prudent for two reasons. First,
review may be unilaterally initiated by the President or the Committee. 230 Second, the law empowers CFIUS to dissolve a merger
or acquisition at any time in the future if a filing has not been
made, regardless of whether or not the acquisition or merger is
complete. 231
If the President finds that there is credible evidence that the
foreign entity seeking control might take actions that threaten the
national security of the United States, 232 and no other laws can
provide adequate and appropriate authority for the President to
deal with this matter, 233 he may “suspend or prohibit any covered
transaction that threatens to impair the national security of the
United States.” 234 The President’s choice to suspend or prohibit a
transaction is not subject to judicial review. 235
Several of the factors that CFIUS takes into account for national security requirements can be applied in the field of intellec225

50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
Id. § 2170(a)(3).
227
Id. § 2170(a)(4).
228
Id. § 2170(b)(1)(B). Even when these investigations allow a deal to go through,
they have generally proven to be fatal to an investment deal. See, e.g., Gotts et al., supra
note 224.
229
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(C)(i); Gotts et al., supra note 224.
230
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(D).
231
Id. § 2170(d)(3).
232
Id. § 2170(d)(4)(A).
233
Id. § 2170(d)(4)(B).
234
Id. § 2170(d)(1).
235
Id. § 2170(e).
226
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tual property. For example, the Commission may review the potential effect of the proposed transaction on the sale of military
goods or technology. 236 This covers instances where a foreign nation’s lack of intellectual property protection can lead to the proliferation of technological secrets. Factor five of a CFIUS review
takes into consideration the effect that the proposed transaction
would have on United States technological leadership, 237 while
factor seven takes into consideration the potential national security
implications of critical U.S. technologies. 238 Indeed, CFIUS, as a
matter of course, is particularly interested in transactions in which
the U.S. entity has export-controlled technology, or technologies
critical to national defense. 239
CFIUS emerged from obscurity in February 2006, when it
scrutinized and approved Dubai Port World’s acquisition of U.S.
port leases. 240 Under the deal, Dubai Port World, a company controlled by the government of the United Arab Emirates, was to be
contracted to manage six American ports. 241 In response to the uproar caused by CFIUS’s approval, Dubai Port World formally
asked the U.S. government to conduct a full forty-five-day investigation. 242 Although this investigation also approved the transaction, the deal later collapsed in the face of enormous public outcry
and opposition. 243
2. The Executive Should Make Better Use of CFIUS in
Reviewing the National Security Implications of
Intellectual Property Theft
By scrutinizing foreign investment deals for national security
threats, CFIUS is in a great position to monitor the intellectual
236

Id. § 2170(f)(4).
Id. § 2170(f)(5).
238
Id. § 2170(f)(7).
239
Gotts et al., supra note 224.
240
Id.
241
Sheryl Stolberg, How a Business Deal Became a Big Liability for Republicans in
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at A14.
242
David Sanger, Dubai Deal Will Undergo Deeper Inquiry into Security, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2006, at A15.
243
Jim Rutenberg, Bush Set to Approve Takeover of 9 Military Plants by Dubai, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2006, at A20.
237
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property trends of various nations as well as the national security
implications of those trends. If a foreign entity is known to offer
weak IP protection of sensitive technologies, then CFIUS can stop
the acquisition from taking place and monitor the trend of intellectual property protection in that nation. CFIUS is taking a more
prominent role in the national security debate. The FDI transactions notified for national security review in 2006 more than doubled over the 2004 level to 113 transactions. 244 Also, in 2006, a
total of seven forty-five-day investigations were launched, which
was as many as had been initiated in the prior five years combined. 245
In light of Representative Duncan’s statement 246 before the
USCC, which indicated that Chinese companies advertise their reverse engineering capabilities, it is not surprising that CFIUS
would hear alarm bells when faced with deals that could pour protected U.S. technologies into the underground counterfeit bazaar.
Past CFIUS reviews show that the Committee is in a prime position to flag FDI deals with foreign entities that do not give adequate protection to intellectual property. In 2005 Lenovo of China
made a bid to buy IBM’s personal computer business. 247 CFIUS
investigated the deal because of a potential for industrial espionage
and the risk that transferred technology would be used for military
purposes. 248 Among the technologies which were at risk were battery, encryption and product integration, all of which could be used
to advance China’s military capabilities.249 CFIUS also launched a
forty-five-day investigation in 2003 when Hutchison Whampoa
Ltd. made a bid for telecommunications giant Global Crossing.250
Hutchison Whampoa was commonly known to have ties to the
Chinese military. 251
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Gotts et al., supra note 224.
Id.
246
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
247
Steve Lohr, Is I.B.M.’s Lenovo Proposal a Threat to National Security?, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at C6.
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Id.
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Besides the Dubai Port World deal, the largest CFIUS firestorm was triggered in 2005 when the Chinese firm CNOOC made
a bid for the U.S. oil firm Unocal. 252 The deal primarily raised
fears over energy security. 253 The critical components of Unocal
were its crude oil reserves, located in Southeast Asia, and the technology used in certain blends of gasoline. 254 The argument over
the deal became so heated that Congress passed several resolutions
declaring that the acquisition would threaten U.S. national security. 255 Congress went so far as to threaten to use its Article I
power to regulate commerce with foreign nations to block the
deal. 256 Although these investigations proved fatal to the acquisitions, all still received the green light from CFIUS. In only one
case did the President exercise his power to block a deal: a 1990
acquisition of a U.S. aerospace manufacturer by a Chinese firm. 257
What this history of investigations makes clear is that serious
anxieties exist in matters of national security, especially when
China is involved. 258 Congress should extend the mandate of
CFIUS and use its resources to monitor the national security implications of intellectual property theft.
CONCLUSION
The illusion that the trade in counterfeits is a victimless
crime—that at worst harms wealthy CEOs in the luxury goods or
entertainment industries 259 —is far from the truth. Chinese intellectual property theft leads to dangerous drugs, fake currency, a
252

Id.
Steve Lohr, Who’s Afraid of China Inc.?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2005, at 31 [hereinafter Lohr, Who’s Afraid].
254
Gotts et al., supra note 224.
255
Lohr, Who’s Afraid, supra note 253, at 31. The outcry was so universal that Representative Richard Pombo’s resolution passed 398 to 15. Investors in CNOOC were also
opposed to the deal. Investment bank William Blair & Company sold its $160 million
stake in CNOOC over fears that the company’s moves were directed too much by the
Chinese government, and not a sense of capitalism and profit. Id.
256
See id.
257
Gotts et al., supra note 224.
258
Lohr, Who’s Afraid, supra note 253.
259
See Counterfeit Goods Hearing, supra note 50, at 2–3 (statement of Sen. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs).
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distrust of American products, the financing of criminal organizations and the proliferation of sensitive technologies. These counterfeit goods pose a direct national security threat to the United
States. This threat may have been overlooked in part because of a
narrow, traditional definition of national security. In several instances, however, Congress has allowed for a broad interpretation
of national security to give the U.S. maximum protection.
Congress and the Executive should implement several statutory changes aimed at monitoring and addressing the national security threats posed by counterfeit goods from China. The general
provisions which facilitate U.S.-China relations should provide for
strict and detailed monitoring of China’s enforcement of its intellectual property laws. Potential national security threats caused by
counterfeits should be analyzed in § 6951 reports to Congress and
hearings before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission. Finally, Congress should make use of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States to monitor threats
posed by intellectual property theft.

